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FINANCIAL POLICY IN KENYA : THE BACKGROUND TO THE RESERVE CRISIS OF 1971. 
by J.R. King, Department of Economics, University of Nairobi. 
When Rabbit asked, "Honey or condensed milk with your 
bread?" Pooh was so excited that he said, "Both", and 
then, so as not to seem greedy, he added, "But don't 
bother about the bread, please". 
(from "Winnie-the-Pooh", by A,A, Milne) 
The object of this paper is to explain why Kenya's reserves of foreign 
exchange fell from a peak of K£ 89.1 millions in March 1971 
to K£ 62.2 millions by the end of November of that year.^ Parts 1 
and 2 of the paper are both of an introductory nature: part 1 
describes the behaviour of reserves in the six years from December 
1966 to December 1972, in order to set the 1971 "crisis" in its 
context; part 2 discusses two recent attempts at explanation, 
explains why in my opinion they are unsatisfactory, and indicates 
the kind of explanation which this paper seeks to provide. Parts 
3 and which make up the bulk of the paper, seek the origins of 
the crisis in the Kenya Government's financial policy in the years 
leading up to 1971. 
Because the topic of the paper may be of some interest outside the 
community of academic economists, and because my intention is to 
describe the financial background to the crisis only in very 
general terms, I have tried to make the body of the paper as simple 
as possible. One result of this is that the paper contains a number 
of rather bald and over-simple assertions. Some of the most glaring 
ones are qualified in footnotes. The reader who finds the main body 
of the paper lacking in rigour is therefore urged to read it in 
conjunction with these footnotes. 
One final preliminary comment on the nature of the paper is in 
order. It is a rather uneasy combination of history and contemporary 
polemic. It is history, because I am concerned only with the causes 
of an event which now lies in the past, and not - at least not in 
this paper - with the consequences of that: event, which are of course 
still with us. But it is also polemic, because the consequences of 
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of the reserve loas, and in particular the policies which Government 
adopted to reverse it, can in large measure be traced to perceptions 
of what was happening which were in some respects mistaken. It seems 
obvious, as one economist has argued, that "the remedies for balance-
of-payments difficulties should be selected in the light of their 
2 
causes" ; and so although this paper does not discuss financial 
policy in Kenya after the reserves began to fall it cannot avoid 
some implicit criticism of the handling of the reserve crisis, as 
well as explicit criticism of the policies which led. to it. Such 
criticism is always easier, and therefore less welcome, when it is 
offered with the wisdom of hindsight, as in this paper. But if a 
study of past mistakes can help reduce the danger of their repetition, 
historical polemic may serve a useful function. 
Part 1 j The Behaviour of Kenya's Foreign Exchange Reserves. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the behaviour of Kenya's foreign exchange 
reserves from December 1966 (shortly after the Central Bank of Kenya 
began operations) until December 1972. The quarterly data on which 
this Figure is based is contained in the Statistical Appendix. 
Figure 1 (a) shows (i) the level of reserves at the end of each 
quarter, and (ii) a level of reserves corresponding to the equivalent 
of four months' imports averaged over the previous three years which 
the Central Bank is required by Section 26 (l) of the Central Bank of 
Kenya Act to "use its best endeavours to maintain". Figure 1(b) 
shows quarterly percentage changes in the level of reserves. 
It should be noted that the reserves shown in Figure 1 are Kenya's 
foreign exchange reserves rather than simply that portion which was 
held by the Central Bank. The latter as a percentage of the total 
rose from 40*6$ December 1966 to l^.lfh in December 1972, in 
accordance with the Government's policy of centralising the country's 
reserves in the hands of the Central Bank. The Act seems to suggest 
that it is the Bank's reserves rather than Kenya's which should be 
maintained at the equivalent of four month's imports? this is 
certainly the interpretation which the Bank has place2upon it. This 
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is however rather odd.: from the economy's point of view (which is 
surely the point of view which the Central Bank should adopt) it is 
the total quantity of reserves which matters. Their exact location 
is unimportant. 
A clear pattern emerges from Figure 1. The six-year period can be 
divided into five distinct phases as follows: 
(i) the first year after the establishment of the Central Bank, 
when reserves rose, though rather slowly; 
(ii) the last quarter of 1967, when reserves dropped suddenly; 
(iii) the period from the first quarter of 1968 to the first 
quarter of 1971, when there was a very rapid and reasonably 
steady increase; 
(iv) the remainder of 1971, when reserves fell steeply; and finally 
(v) a period of stabilisation and recovery beginning in 1972. 
Thus 1971 was not the first occasion on which there was a run on the 
reserves: a fall occurred at the end of 1967 which was as large in 
relative (though not in absolute) terms as that of 1971. Furthermore, 
in 1967 Kenya's reserves did fall below the level of four months' 
imports, whereas in 1971 they did not. The most interesting contrast 
between the two occasions which emerges from the Figure, however, 
concerns the speed of recovery of reserves after their initial fall: 
after 1967 recovery was very rapid, wiiereas in 1971-2 it was much less 
so. This suggests that the reserve loss was of a quite different 
nature on the two occasions. That, indeed, is what I shall argue in 
the remainder of the paper. 
Part 2 : Some Suggested Explanations. 
Early in 1972 an international mission undertook a study of the 
causes of unemployment in the Kenya economy. The mission's report, 
published later in the same year, had very little to say about 
unemployment (strictly defined), but a great deal to say about a 
wide range of related issues. The mission made the following comment 
on the 1971 reserve crisis: 
"The balance of payments is now beginning ta set limits on 
the earlier pattern of growth. This is in marked contrast 
to the 1960'S, when Kenya seemed to have solved the problem-, 
of reconciling economic growth with a strong balance of 
payments ... 
The first signs that this situation was precarious 
appeared in 1970, when imports rose sharply ... 
The Government has already started to take a series of 
measures to stop the loss of foreign exchange ... These 
measures may well reverse the rise in imports ... But the 
point is that the myth of effortless growth, a Kenyan 
"miracle", had been shattered. It has suddenly become clear 
that the boom had been of a kind that caused stresses in 
the balance of payments, just as it had been the sort of 
boom that aggravated unemployment and inequality." (My emphasis). 
i 
This is a very condensed "explanation" indeed, and the meaning of 
the sentence emphasised above is not likely to be clear to any 
reader who is unfamiliar with the "structuralist" interpretation 
of inflation in Latin America (and more" recent writings of the 
"structuralist" school of thought), which fought a celebrated 
academic battle with the opposing "monetarist" interpretation 4 
during the 1950's. For those readers who are not familiar with 
this controversy, the following rather simplistic translation of 
what the sentence was probably intended to mean will have to serves 
From Independence to the end of the 1960's the Kenya economy 
was growing fairly rapidly. But the distribution of this 
increasing wealth was at the same time becoming more unequal. 
Now,it appears that the rich have a higher propensity to 
import consumption-goods than the poor; so increasing 
inequality would mean that the demand for imported consumption 
.goods would grow faster than income. At the same time, rapid 
growth would mean that the demand for capital goods, largely 
imported, would rise steeply. But Kenya's exports are mainly 
primary products, overseas demand for which will tend to rise 
relatively slowly. Thus, with rapid growth in the Kenya economy 
the balance of payments will inevitably tend to deteriorate.. 
There may be truth in this argument, although some of the empirical 
assertions which it makes - in particular, the assertion of increasing 
inequality during the 1960's - have yet to be shown to be true for 
the Kenya economy. But for our present purposes the important point 
to be made about it is that it assumes that the rate of growth of 
the economy is something given "exogenously". As presented, the 
"structuralist interpretation provides no explanation of why the 
economy should grow at a rate higher than the rate of growth of 
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export and import-substituting production, and hence impose strains 
on the balance of payments! as an explanation of why reserves should 
fall it is at best, therefore, very far from complete. Furthermore, 
this type of explanation raises rather more questions than it solves. 
If the reserve loss was really due to long-term structural forces of 
the type outlined above, why was it that reserves fell so suddenly 
in the second quarter of 1971? and why had they been rising so steeply 
for the previous three years? 
An explanation of a quite different type was offered by the Govern-
ment's "Economic Survey" for 1971, which was published in June 1972. 
After observing that "a drop in reserves of this magnitude was 
unprecedented" and that, in general, "the causes ... related to both 
domestic and international factors", the Survey proceeded to list 
the following specific causes: 
(i) a rise in commercial bank lending, especially "to those 
sectors which have a higher propensity to import"; 
(ii) inflation in industrialised countries, which raised the 
price of Kenya's imports; 
(iii) "the uncertainty in international money markets ... (which) 
promoted accelerated import payments and delayed export, receipts"; 
(iv) increased investment expenditure, by both Government and 
the private sector; 
(v) higher food imports, necessitated by the drought which 
affected Kenya's agriculture in 1970; and finally 
(vi) "the acquisition by the Government of a part of the foreign 
holdings in the banking, oil refining and electricity industries, 
as an expression of its policy of establishing a greater 
5 national stake in strategic industries". 
It is possible, of course, for us to take issue with some of the 
factors mentioned in this list. For instance, one wonders why the 
Survey found it necessary to qualify its comment on bank lending 
with the rider "to those sectors which have a higher propensity to 
import", when the import propensity of the borrowing sector could be 
expected to influence the timing but not the amount of the reserve 
loss consequent (in equilibrium) on bank credit expansion.^Second, 
the evidence that international monetary confusion did result in 
significant changes in the timing of Kenya's import payments and 
export receipts in 1971 is rather weak. But in general it must be 
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acknowledged that the factors mentioned in the Economic Survey's 
list were present in the Kenya economy in 1971, and that each of them, 
taken on its own and with other things being equal, would have had 
an adverse effect on reserves. 
But as an explanation of the reserve loss the list remains unsatis-
factory, for two main reasons. First, it is not really one explanation, 
but includes parts of two, explanations, of different types. Item (i), 
the rise in commercial bank lending, would not have been something 
different from item (iv), increased investment expenditure; it would 
merely have been another side - the financial side - of the same 
coin. Second, and much more serious, neither of these two explanations 
is really complete. They beg a number of rather important questions: 
for instance, why did bank lending rise steeply when it did? and why 
was investment running at such a high level? 
This incompleteness becomes clear when one examines the list in 
detail. No. (iii), to the extent that it occurred, could reasonably 
be expected to reverse itself without Government action; nos. (v) 
and (vi) were of a once-for-all nature; and, on the assumption that 
the long-run price elasticity of demand for imports would be higher 
than the short-run elasticity, no. (ii) could be expected to become 
less serious over time as a source of reserve loss. Why then, one 
wonders, was the reserve loss treated so seriously? For countries do 
not keep foreign exchange reserves in order to earn a rather meagre 
rate of interest on them: they keep them, rather, to guard against 
having to take drastic measures (of the kind taken by the Kenya 
Government in 1971-2) when unexpected once-for-all factors of the 
kind which make up most of the Economic Survey's list arise. If 
this list was a complete account of what caused the reserve loss, 
therefore, the seriousness with which it was treated would be hard 
to explain. It will be argued in this paper that the reserve loss 
really was a crisis, which did necessitate some fairly drastic 
remedial action. To argue thus we shall have to find some rather 
more fundamental causes than those contained in the Survey's list. 
A convenient point at which to start the search is the familiar 
"income and expenditure" identity, which may be written, in rather 
crude form, as follows: 
C + I + G + X = C + S + T + M 
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(where C is consumption expenditure on domestically-produced goods 
and services, I is private sector investment spending, G is public 
sector spending, X is exports of goods and services, S is private 
saving, T is public sector revenue from taxes, and M is imports). 
In this rather simple economy, foreign exchange reserves will decline 
if M is greater than X in any time-period. For this to happens it is 
necessary that I + G be greater than S +• T; and for that inequality 
to arise the finance to make it possible must be provided from 
somewhere in the economy. 
The inequality usually arises for one of two reasons. First, Government 
may spend more than it receives, so that G exceeds T. Typically, this 
deficit is financed by Government borrowing from the banking system; 
to the extent that the excess of G over T is not matched by an equal 
excess of S over I , :M must be greater than X . Alternatively, private 
investment expenditure I may be greater than S. This is typically 
financed, in countries such as Kenya,-by bank credit expansion to the 
private sector at a rate greater than that at which the economy is 
making savings available to the banks in the form of deposits (as 
7 seems to have happened throughout East Africa between 1945 and- 1965- ) 
We shall now investigate these two possible sources of the finance 
which was necessary for the 1971 reserve crisis to occur. Before we 
begin it must be emphasised that whatever else may have been happening 
in the economy, financial developments must have permitted the reserve 
loss. This is an assumption of the paper, not a conclusion. It 
remains for us only to establish whether in Kenya's financial history 
prior to 1971 there can also be found sufficient conditions for the 
crisis. 
.Part 3 > Financial Policy; The Finance for Government Expenditure. 
Throughout most of the Colonial period in Kenya, the limitations 
placed on the Colonial government by the metropolis were such as 
to preclude deficit financing. Until 1955 expenditure could only be 
undertaken if the funds, and the resources, had first been made 
9 
available from taxation, the revenues of Government corporations, 
or long-term borrowing in London. (To a very limited extent, the 
colonial Government was also able to tap local savings by issuing 
long-term securities in Kenya, and it could borrow small sums from 
its commercial banker. The latter source of funds might be considered 
to be "deficit financing", but it was a source which could be tapped 
only for very short periods of time, and certianly not on a permanent 
basis). This does not mean that there were not important issues of 
financial policy with which the Kenya Government: had to deal during 
the colonial period, but it does mean that "printing money", in any 
of its various disguises, was not among the Government's financial 
policy options. 
This situation changed in December 1955, when the regulations of the 
East African Currency Board were amended to permit the Board to hold 
the securities of the East African Governments, within stated limits, 
Q 
as backing for its currency issue. The financial implications of 
9 
this "fiduciary issue" have been thoroughly analysed elsewhere. The 
most important point, for our purposes, is that the change in the 
Currency Board regulations did open up the possibility of deficit 
financing of Government expenditure on a permanent basis: once a 
Government had borrowed from E.A.C.B. by issuing securities to it 
in exchange for currency, there was no danger that the debt would 
ever have to be repaid. 
By mid-1965, when it was announced that E.A.C.B. would be replaced 
by separate Central Banks in each of the independent East African 
countries, Uganda had used 96 % of the fiduciary issue to which it 
was entitled; Tanzania had used 64 %; but Kenya had used only 35 %.10 
This financial conservatism of the Kenya Government in the early 1960's 
is rather surprising, because the temptations for Kenya to make use 
of the fiduciary issue to which it was entitled around the time of 
independence must have been very strong. For Kenya became independent 
at a time when the Government was faced with a serious financial 
problem, the nature and origins of which we must briefly consider.1"'' 
During the 1950's the expenditures of the colonial Government had 
risen steeply, largely because of spending on the Emergency, but 
also because of substantial new development efforts undertaken in 
the mid-1950's (which included the important Swynnerton programme 
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for smallholder agriculture). But tax revenues rose, in comparison, 
rather slowly. The gap was closed by the Kenya Government drawing 
down its reserves (which must be distinguished from the reserves held 
as currency backing by E.A.C.B.), and by loans and grants direct from 
the metropolitan Government in London. By the early 1960's the 
Emergency was over, but Kenya Government expenditure continued to 
rise as a result, among other things, of the commencement of 
Government-financed transfers of land in the "White Highlands" from 
European settlers to African farmers, and of rapidly rising (though 
perhaps, with the approach of independence, belated) expenditure on 
education. By this time the Government's financial reserves we? e all 
but exhausted. The deficit was met almost entirely by loans and grants, 
12 
on recurrent and development account, from London. Even so, the 
finance available to the Kenya Government was insufficient to prevent 
a drastic cut-back in public sector investment expenditure in the 
years before independence, which was far more pronounced than the 
decline in private sector investment in this period. 
At independence the Kenya Government was confronted by an urgent need 
to reverse the decline in public sector capital formation, by embarking 
on a positive development programme; by an inevitable increase in 
recurrent expenditure as it assumed certain functions formerly 
undertaken by the colonial power, such as external defence and 
diplomatic representation; and by the anticipated removal of grants 
from London on recurrent account as a source of funds. Thus the 
temptation to resort to deficit financing in the form of borrowing 
from E.A.C.B., as the Uganda Government was doing, must, as we 
suggested above, have been strong. Yet the World Bank mission, 
which surveyed the economic problems of Kenya in 1962-3 and 
advised the new Government on its development programme, made no 
mention of this form of finance in its published report.^ To argue 
against "money creation" in the Kenya of 1962-3 would have been one 
thing, but to ignore the possibility altogether seems in retrospect 
very strange indeed. 
Since 1962-3 Central Government expenditure in Kenya has risen at 
an average annual rate of slightly more than 10% per annum, as shown 
in Figure 2. In the first year of independence the rise was more than 
this (18.0$), and in the following year correspondingly lower. The 
other major exception to the generalisation is the period I969 - 1971, 
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when expenditure appears to have accelerated dramatically. To some 
extent this is an illusion, due to the Central Government's taking 
over responsibility for some K£ 12 millions of County Council 
expenditures in 1970. But even allowing for this transfer, there does 
seem to have been some acceleration at the end of our period. 
'a 
Our concern here is not this rising level of Central Government 
expenditure per se, but rather the manner in which it was financed. 
Figure 3 shows the percentage contribution to the finance of Central 
Government expenditure made by (i) recurrent revenues (mainly taxes, 
but also defined here to included such items as licence fees and 
development project earnings); (ii) external loans and grants, on 
both recurrent and development accounts; (iii) long-term domestic 
borrowing; and (iv) short-term domestic borrowing. We must now consider 
these four sources of finance in some detail. 
(i) Recurrent revenues. The contribution of different forms of 
recurrent revenue to Government expenditure is important not only 
because of the different ways in which the various forms of revenue 
can affect the economy, but also because any expenditure which is not 
covered in this way has to be financed either from foreign grants- or 
fiom some form of borrowing. Figure 3 (i) shows a clear pattern. The 
percentage contribution of recurrent revenues to Central Government 
expenditure in Kenya was 77•3$ in the last full year of colonial rule; 
it fell to 70.4$ in the first year of independence, and then rose 
steadily to more than 80$ in 1967/8, at which level it remained until 
the early 1970's. In the second half of the 1960's, which is the period 
'with which we are particularly concerned, the Central Government's 
"borrowing requirement" was therefore roughly constant, at slightly 
over 20$ of total Central Government expenditure. 
(i'i) External loans and grants. In 1962/3 and 1963/4 this "borrowing-
requirement" was almost exactly met by external loans and grants 
the latter making up almost one-half of total external finance in 
these years. Thereafter, external finance declined fairly steadily in 
relative importance as a source of finance, ^rants fell from an 
abso±ute level of K£ 9.94 millions in I963/4 to K£ 0.82 millions in 
1970/1; in absolute as well as relative terms they were tnerefore of 
little significance by the early 1970's. External loans, on the other-
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or note The appropriate classification must depend on whether the 
borrowing makes available to the Government resources equal in 
value to the expenditure financed in this way (by displacing 
private expenditures, or by inducing a capital inflow of this 
amount); or whether the resources made available by long-term 
borrowing are less than the Government expenditures to be financed 
14 
m this way. This is a question which can only be resolved 
empirically, for a particular economy and at a particular point in 
time. We must therefore consider the nature of Government's long-
term domestic borrowing during the 1960's. 
Between mid-1960 and mid-1965 there was virtually no change in the 
Kenya Government's long-term domestic indebtedness. Since then there 
appears to have been a reasonably steady increase. But the steadiness 
is, as we shall see, rather deceptive. In order to be able to discuss 
the nature of the growth in Government's long-term domestic indebtedness, 
we must investigate who held the debt. 
TABLE 1 : HOLDERS OF LOCALLY-REGISTERED KENYA GOVERNMENT DEBT. 
Holder end Dec. 63 
K£M 
end June 72 
National Social Security Fund 26, ,14 
Central Government 3. 35 17. .47 
Local Government 0. . 76 0, .95 
Post Office Savings Bank 0, ,95 3, ,38 
E.A. Community Institutions 0, , 87 0. .40 
Other Public Sector Institutions 0, , 50 0, ,51 
Commercial Banks 1. ,64 8. .09 
Insurance Companies 2. ,01 6 , 13 
Other Companies 0, ,98 8, ,90 
Private Individuals 0, ,32 0, .29 
Other (within E.A.) 0, ,40 0, • 37 
" (Sterling Area) 1, >50 1, ,37 
" (outside Sterling Area) 0. .11 0, .01 
E.A.C.B. /' Central Bank of Kenya 3, ,71 3, .67 
TOTAL: 17, ,09 77, .66 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, Annual Reports. 
It emerges from this Table that for the majority of holders listed 
there was no significant increase in their holdings of Kenya Govern-
ment securities between 1963 and 1972. The more than K£ 60 millions 
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increase in the total outstanding was almost entirely due to increased 
holdings by the National Social Security Fund (whose holdings rose 
from zero to K£ 26.14 m.); by the Central Government itself, whose 
holdings - held mainly in pension and similar funds - rose by K£ 14.12 m.; 
by the Post Office Savings Bank, Insurance Companies and other non-bank 
(mainly financial) institutions, whose holdings rose by K£ 14*47 m.; 
and by the Commercial Banks, whose holdings rose by K£ 6.45 m. 
Of these four types of holdings which did grow rapidly, holdings by 
the National Social Security Fund, which since it began operations 
in 1966 has been collecting contributions from workers and their 
employers on a compulsory basis, are clearly "forced savings"; this 
source of Government borrowing does displace an almost exactly equal 
amount of private expenditure, and therefore cannot be considered as 
"deficit financing". From 1966 to about the middle of 1970 borrowing 
from the N.S.S.F. grew very rapidly indeed, as the coverage of the 
Fund was extended. But from 1970 onwards this coverage has not been 
much extended, so that Government long-term borrowing from the N.S.S.Fo 
must now be expected to increase only at the same rate as the wage-bill 
of that sector of the economy which is liable to make contributions. 
To sustain tne growth of total long-term domestic borrowing after the 
end of the 1960's the Government was thus obliged to look elsewhere. 
In 1968-70 it achieved a once-for-all "forced capital inflow" of 
almost K£ 5 by requiring the Commercial Banks to maintain a 
minimum level of capital reserves in Kenya. In the early 1970's this 
form of borrowing was again boosted in a once-for-all manner as 
Public Sector pension funds sold their overseas securities and 
purchased Kenya Government stock instead. 
There are two main lessons to be drawn from this rather cursory 
discussion. The first is that in the late 1960's and early 1970's 
the major part of Central Government long-term domestic borrowing 
should not be considered to be "deficit financing": most of it took 
the form either of forced savings through captive financial instit-
utions, or of forced capital inflow. In order to simplify the 
discussion which follows, we shall assume (what is almost certainly 
not exactly correct) that none of the long-term borrowing was 
"deficit financing". Second, the very large proportion of Government 
expenditure which was financed in this way at the end of the 1960's 
was made possible only by a succession of once-for-all expedients. 
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Until the Kenya Government begins to compete actively for private 
savings in the open market, which it hardly did in the period under 
review, the rate of growth of long-term domestic borrowing of the 
late 1960's and early 1970's could not (and cannot) be sustained. 
Economic growth will, of course, automatically provide the Government 
with a source of long-term funds from the N.S.S.F., the P.O.S.B., 
Insurance Companies and pension funds. But the 11% of Government 
expenditure which was financed in this way at the end of the 1960's 
Is most unlikely to be approached again. 
(i^) Short-term domestic borrowing. Figure 3 (iv) shows the 
percentage of Central Government expenditure financed by short-term 
borrowing (a) after deducting changes in the Exchequer cash balance, 
and (b) before deducting this balance. The gross figures ( ( b ) ) 
show intended expenditure financed by short-term borrowing, whereas 
the net figures ( (a) ) show actual expenditure financed in this way. 
Apart from 1965/6, when there was a considerable shortfall in 
expected Government revenues from other sources and therefore a fall 
in the Government's cash balances, short-term borrowing was an 
insignificant source of finance before the first issue of Treasury 
Bills was made at the end of March 1969. By the end of June 1969 
K£ 5.0 m. of Treasury Bills were outstanding, amounting to 4.8% of 
Government expenditure in 1968/9. But almost half of this merely 
financed an increase in the cash reserve, so that the net deficit 
element was only about 3% - still a very modest figure. 
In 1969/70 the Government redeemed this Treasury Bill issue, and 
instead borrowed K£ 5.0 m. from the Central Bank: these two changes 
effectively cancelled one another out.1^ At the same time the 
Government did borrow slightly more than K£ 5.0 m. short-term in 
this year through the issue of Tax Reserve Certificates , and by 
borrowing from the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation."1"^ But, 
since the short-term cash position simultaneously Improved by almost 
K£ 8.0 m., the deficit-financed portion of expenditure in 1969/70 
was actually negative. 
There was a dramatic change, however, in 1970/1. Government recommenced 
its issue of Treasury Bills (which had become, due to certain 
financial conditions which we shall examine in the next section of 
the paper, an extraordinarily cheap source of funds) so that K£ 10.0 m. 
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were outstanding by the end of the fiscal year; and it borrowed a 
further K£ 5.0 m. from the Central Bank. The deficit-financed element 
in Government expenditure thus jumped in 1970/1 to over 8$. Clearly, 
this was an important change in policy, for in contrast to I965/6 
the deficit of I970/I was planned. What was the reason for the 
change? 
The most straightforward way for us to approach this question is by 
examining Kenya's Development Plan for the period 1970-74* which was 
17 
published at the end of 1969. That Plan provided for Central 
Government development expenditures over the five year period from 
I969/7O to 1973/4 of K£ 180.0 m., in constant price terms s "while 
some of the investment projections in the Plan are to be regarded 
more as forecasts than as fixed Plan targets, the development budget 
of the Central Government represents a firm commitment to implement 
a large number of carefully selected development projects" (Plan, 
p. 147? my emphasis). While expenditures had been carefully determined, 
however, the Plan was much less certain about the manner in which 
they would be financed. "A possible financing pattern could be as 
follows: 
1. Surplus on recurrent budget 20.0 
2. Borrowing from N.S.S.P. 30.0 
3- Other local borrowing (excl. 4) 10.0 
4. Treasury Bills, and borrowing from CBK 25.0 
5. Grants and loans from abroad 95»0 
Total: K£ 180.0 m. " (Plan, p. 163) 
Since the Plan stated (p. 164) that external finance was expected 
to cover 13$ of total (as opposed to development) expenditures 
during the Plan period, we may deduce what the financing pattern 
for total expenditures was expected to look like: 
EXPECTED FINANCE OP CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, I969/7O to 73// 
Recurrent revenues 570 ( 78.0$) 
Borrowing: External 95 (13-0$) 
Long-term, domestic 40 ( 5-5$) 
Short-term, domestic 25 ( 3-5$) 
Total Expenditure/Finance K£ 730 m (100$ ) 
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We may now compare this "possible financing pattern" with our earlier 
discussion of the actual experience of the late 1960®s, First, the 
proportion of total expenditure which it was planned to cover from 
recurrent revenues ( 780Of- ) was very similar to the actual proportion 
so covered in the late 1960's. Second, the proportion to be covered 
by long-term domestic borrowing was a good deal lower. The Plan 
recognised this, but explained ( p. 163 ) that room had to be allowed 
for some K£ 10.0 m. of long-term borrowing by local authorities. In 
the light of this, and of our earlier remarks about the possibilities 
of continuing to increase long-term domestic indebtedness at the rate 
of the late 1960's, a contribution of seems to h ave been a reason™ 
able expectation for funds provided from this source. Third, despite 
the comment of one observer 'hat "the Kenya Government foreign financing 
requirements ... appear con rvative, in terms of past performance"^0, 
K£ 95,0 m* looks a distinc^y unreasonable forecast for external 
finance if this was to be obtained, as we may safely assume to have 
been the intention, on concessionary terms. In effect the Government 
was expecting to double the percentage contribution of external finance 
to its expenditure, and to increase its average annual sjnount during 
the Flan period by about two and one-half times from the actual levels 
1967/8 and 1968/9. Since the Flan's forecasts are in constant price 
terms, the discrepancy between the experience of the late 1960's and 
the Government's hopes for the early 1970's is actually even greater 
than this® Furthermore, in marked contrast to the two previous Develop-
ment Dlans of the independent Kenya Government, that for 1970-74 gave 
no indication at all of how much foreign finance had already been com-
mitted, how much was under negotiation, and how much remained to be 
foundo 
One's suspicions that the Government itself had doubts about its target 
for foreign generosity arc confirmed by a most remarkable statement with 
which the Plan concluded its discussion of the financing of Central 
Government expenditure: 
"Unless Kenya succe Is in obtaining the necessary foreign 
exchange ... tc met ;h the rather ambitious development 
programme, the -et^rve position ... may also change rapidly 
if the necessa: .7 steps are not trJcen in advance to curb 
imports and secure a sufficient supply of internal credits 
This would be a highly undesirable - and unnecessary -
situation but unfortunately not entirely under Government 
control." (Plan,p. I65). 
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The impression conveyed, by this statement is that the Government 
rather cold-bloodedly planned the 1971 reserve crisis, and its 
reaction to it, as early as the middle of 1969• For a level of 
real expenditure had been decided upon which could only be financed 
without a sizeable deficit if foreign finance could be obtained at 
a far more generous rate than ever before. This foreign finance was 
not in the pipeline; and when, not surprisingly, it failed to appear 
in the early years of the Plan the Government undertook in the single 
year 1970/1 three-fifths of the deficit financing which had been 
budgeted for the entire Plan period. Need we look any further for 
the cause of the 1971 crisis? 
Unfortunately for the length of this paper, the answer to that 
question is "yes". There are two main reasons why Government's 
deficit financing in 1970/1 fails to provide an adequate explanation 
on its own of the events of 1971-
The first is a matter of degree. It is possible to estimate, very 
crudely and on the basis of some rather simple assumptions, by how 
much K£ 15 millions of Government short-term borrowing would deplete 
the foreign exchange reserves. If exports continued at a constant 
rate, the equilibrium reserve loss would have been rather less than 
K£ 15 m. provided that the commercial banking system did not respond 
to the receipt of cash deposits resulting from the deficit-financed 
expenditure by expanding lending. If the commercial t anking system 
had been fully "loaned up", and had responded to the receipt of 
deposits by expanding its lending, the loss of reserves could have 
been much greater than this; but even in this case, given plausible 
values for the relevant parameters of Kenya's monetary system, the 
loss of reserves would have been much less than the K£ 40 m. which 
was necessary, in 1971, to reduce them to the level of four months' 
importsi^Thus there would have been a fall in reserves, but no 
crisis. Indeed if ever there was a strong case for Government to 
indulge in deficit financing at the expense of the foreign exchange 
reserves, 1970/1 would seem to have been an appropriate time. But 
then the fall should have been welcomed as the inevitable result of 
a sensible budget strategy. 
The second reason is a matter of timing. When Government undertakes 
deficit financing, by borrowing from the Central Bank or by selling 
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Treasury Bills to the commercial banks, the immediate effect is an 
increase in Government deposits with the Central Bank. It is only 
when these deposits are spent that there is an injection of money 
into the economy. Thus the effect of Government's activities on the 
monetary system from one month to another is best shown not by the 
amount of deficit financing already undertaken (according to 
Government's revenue and expenditure accounts) but by end-of-the-
month changes in Central Government's net indebtedness to the 
banking system. Figure 4 below shows Central Government indebtedness 
to the banking system at the end of each month from July 1967 to 
July 1972. 
FIGURE 4 : CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDEBTEDNESS TO THE BANKING SYSTEM. 
IClwv 
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This Figure shows very clearly that until the middle of 1971, net 
borrowing from the banking system by the Central Government was 
relatively modest: it was not until after the foreign exchange 
reserves began to decline in April of that year that the major part 
of the deficit financing of 1970/1 began to have an impact on the 
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monetary system. The initial decline in reserves must therefore 
have been due to other factors. In order to investigate what these 
might have been, we must once again go back some way in history. 
Part 4 : Bank Credit Expansion to the Private Sector. 
Throughout most of the colonial period, and indeed up to 1965/6, the 
financial and moneti.ry system in Kenya was closely integrated both 
with that of the remainder of East Africa, and with that of the 
Sterling Area with London at its centre. The operation of the system 
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in this period has been thoroughly analysed elsewhere , so we need 
only consider some of the main points here. 
The system was a very "open" one. As we have noted, until 1955 "the 
issue of currency was automatic: the Governments in East Africa had 
no direct powers to influence the amount in circulation, and even 
after 1955 this power was a restricted one. Second, even if the 
Government had had power over the currency base, this would not have 
given it power to control the supply of money, which according to 
most definitions (and certainly those definitions which might be 
appropriate in Kenya) includes bank deposits as well as currency. 
In a closed system, with commercial banks maintaining their lending 
at the maximum level permitted by their reserve of cash and liquid 
assets and by the minimum "liquid asset ratio" permitted by law or 
by considerations of prudence, control over the currency base and 
over the supply of short-term financial assets may ensure control 
over the total money supply. But the commercial banks in East Africa 
were branches of international banks, with unrestricted access to 
the liquid reserves of their head offices. Thus the effective 
liquid reserves of the commercial banks in East Africa could be 
considered to be, for all practical purposes, infinite. It follows 
that there was no limit on the amount of credit which they could 
extend in East Africa, apart from the number of profitable and. 
prudent outlets for bank funds. The supply of bank credit was 
therefore determined by the effective demand for it (as perceived, 
of course, by the banks themselves). 
At the end of the 1939-45 war the commercial banks had a very high 
liquid assets ratio indeed, due to wartime limitations on their 
lending activities and to wartime restrictions on domestic trade 
and production in those sectors of the economy which might otherwise 
have provided an outlet for the banks' funds. But from 1945 onwards 
bank lending expanded, to reach, by the mid-1960's, a level above 
what would have been possible had the banks not been able to borrow 
cash and "liquidity" from their head offices in London. But in the 
mid-1960's important changes occurred in Kenya's monetary system, 
which effectively ended the openness that made this situation 
possible. 
First, with the approach of independence there is evidence that as 
early as I96O the banks were taking steps to "domesticate" their 
East African operations by restricting their local lending to the 
level warranted by the liquid assets held by the East African branches 
Unfortunately for the banks, the approach of independence also led 
to a substantial withdrawal of deposits, which made it impossible 
for them to achieve this aim without cutting back their lending in 
a very drastic manner: rather than contribute in this way to the 
country's economic difficulties, the banks chose to.allow their 
liquid assets ratio to decline further and continued to rely on 
the liquid reserves of their head offices. It was not until after 
Exchange Control had been imposed on capital exports and transfers 
from East Africa to the rest of the Sterling Area in June 1965 that 
the banks in Kenya were able to bring their lending and their own 
liquid assets towards the desired ratio. 
In the early years of Kenya's independence, when it was hoped that 
the existing common market in East Africa could be preserved and 
indeed strengthened by a political federation, the kind of 
"domestication" which the commercial banks appear to have had in 
mind was a domestication of their East African operations, centred 
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on Nairobi. But in 1964 and 1965 the erosion of the common market 
was begun. When, in June 19^5» was announced that each of the 
East African countries was to have its own Central Bank, it became 
clear to the commercial banks that the domestication at which they 
had to aim was an autonomy of operations within each country. The 
system of seasonal inter-country lending within each bank, with 
Nairobi as the regional head office, had thus to be brought to an 
end. It was not until 1966 at the earliest that the commercial 
banking system in Kenya was operating fully along "national" lines. 
It seems to be clear that as a matter of policy each bank wouli by 
this time have preferred not to borrow either from branches of the 
same bank in other East African countries, or from London. But apart 
from this preference there was still nothing to prevent such borrowing 
if it became necessary (as it did, for a brief period, at the end 
of 1967); and there was still nothing to prevent the banks from 
continuing to utilise deposits with their London offices as a means 
of earning interest on some part of their liquid reserves. In the 
third quarter of 19&7, however, the commercial banks were required 
to reduce such overseas assets to the level of working foreign 
exchange balances, in accordance with the declared policy of 
centralising Kenya's foreign exchange reserves in the hands of the 
Central Bank. The effect of this requirement was to create an 
important demand within Kenya for short-term domestic assets such 
as Treasury Bills. Then, in 1968, the Banking Act required the 
banks to maintain their reserve capital within Kenya (as mentioned 
in the previous section) and formally completed the process of 
domestication. 
The other part of this major revolution in Kenya's monetary system 
was the setting up of the Central Bank in 1966. For the first time 
in history the Kenya Government had an instrument through which it 
could control not only the supply of currency, but also (in a variety 
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of different ways, spelt out in the Central Bank of Kenya Act ) 
the level of commercial bank credit, and so the total money supply. 
The first eighteen months of the Cental Bank's operations were 
relatively quiet. The Bank o«ncremed itself with the issue of the new 
Kenya currency; with organising an inter-bank clearing house; with 
opening accounts for the Government and for the commercial banks; 
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with organising the collection of monetary data; and with taking 
over from the Treasury the administration of exchange control and 
the national debt. In this period the Bank: did not feel it necessary 
to exercise its powers over the level and direction of commercial 
23 bank lending. 
The first major test came on 18 November 1967, when Britain devalued 
the pound Sterling. After a short period of debate and uncertainty, 
it was announced on 21 November that the Kenya shilling would not 
follow this devaluation. Thus the exchange rate between Kenya's 
currency and that of Brit ain, which had remained constant ever since 
1920, was altered. This seems to have led to some considerable 
uncertainty in the private sector: businesses, fearing an eventual 
devaluation of the Kenya shilling to the old parity with Sterling, 
began to repay some of their short-term overseas debts and tended 
to speed up their payments for imports, covering a perceived exchange 
risk by borrowing in Kenya rather than overseas. The effect of this 
was a sudden expansion of the demand for (and supply of) bank credit 
in Kenya, and a sudden, but temporary, fall in Kenya's foreign 
exchange reserves. 
"Under these circumstances the Bank took action which aimed, on the 
one hand, at reducing the demand for advances by the business 
community and, on the other, at reducing the supply of loanable Q / 
funds." First, the Bank began to sell Sterling forward, thus 
eliminating the need for importers and exporters to cover what they 
saw as an exchange risk by borrowing Kenya shillings to sell for 
spot Sterling. The provision of this facility would not have reduced 
the demand for advances, as the Central Bank appears to have suggested; 
but it would have prevented the borrowing from having an immediate 
effect on the country's foreign exchange reserves. And by transferring 
cash from the commercial banks to the Central Bank , it would have 
tended to restrict the supply of credit. Second, at the end of Novem-
ber 1967 the Central Bank prohibited inter-bank lending in Kenya, 
which would have had the effect of raising the level of liquid 
reserves which the commercial banking system taken as a whole would 
feel it prudent to maintain. This prohibition was lifted in July 
1968. And third, the Central Bank requested the commercial banks to 
refuse new credits for speeding up payments for imports, though it 
gave no guidance about how these might be recognised. 
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In general, however, the Bank reacted, very coolly to the reserve 
loss - as indeed was appropriate for a loss which had been diagnosed 
as a temporary one which would correct itself in time if treated 
with "benign neglect". The mildly restrictive measures mentioned 
above were more in the nature of a flexing of the Bank's muscles 
than anything else. Its broad policy was the distinctly laisser faire 
one of "letting the diminishing liquidity of the banking system have 
its full impact on their willingness and capacity to lend ... 
(and of not putting) any obstacles in the way of the commercial 
banks' borrowing from abroad in order to meet commitments arising 
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from their credit activity in Kenya." The rapid recovery o: the 
foreign exchange reserves early in 1968 both confirmed the Centi-al 
Bank's diagnosis of the reserve loss and justified the wisdom of its 
laisser faire policy on this occasion. 
There is an important lesson to be drawn from this non-crisis in 
1967. The Central Bank did not use the powers which it already had 
(and which were spelt out in more detail in the Banking Act of 1968) 
to prescribe statutory minimum liquid asset ratios for the commercial 
banks. Instead it assumed that there was some minimum ratio of liquid 
assets to deposit liabilities which the commercial banks, if left 
to their own devices, would wish to hold; and it was prepared to 
let this ratio set a maximum limit on commercial bank lending. It 
was not until 1 December 1969 that a statutory minimum ratio, of 
12.5 was prescribed. Though it is not possible to be certain 
what the commercial banks' desired ratio was - and in any case the 
"desired ratio" would be likely to have been a somewhat flexible 
one - it seems reasonable for us to assume that the actual ratio 
established after the 1967 episode (by about mid-1968) would provide 
a reasonable indication of the banks' target. Figure 5 below shows 
the liquid assets ratio of Kenya's commercial banking system at the 
26 end of each month from October 1967 to December 1971 
Between March 1969 and March 1971 the commercial banks in Kenya had 
a liquid assets ratio of around 28$, which is the figure which banks 
in Britain are required by law to observe as a minimum. But there 
is no reason at all why a safe ratio in Kenya should be the same 
as the legal minimum in Britain. Certainly, in these two years both 
the Government and the Central Bank felt that commercial bank 
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January 1971 onwards) s during this period the commercial banks 
were not fully "lent up". It follows that, at least in the two 
years before the 1971 crisis, the level of commercial bank lending 
must have been determined by the effective demand for loans (as 
perceived by the commercial banks) rather than by the supply of 
loanable funds. We must now consider what determined the demand for 
loans from the commercial banks. The proposition which will be 
advanced here is that changes in commercial bank lending since, 
the mid-1960's in Kenya can be almost exactly "explained" (in a 
statistical sense) by changes in the economy's inventory stocks. 27 
Figure 6 below shows the level of stocks at the end of each year1, 
and the level of commercial bank lending to the private sector and 
statutory corporations (average end-of-quarter figures) for the 
years 1966 to 1972. 
FIGURE 6 : BANK LENDING AND STOCKS, 1966 to 1972. 
As is well known, to attempt to relate the "first differences" of 
two time-series, as we do in Figure 7, is to subject the relationship 
between the underlying series to a very stringent statistical test 
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indeed. Our data passes this test surprisingly well: with the 
single exception of the 1968-9 observations, there appears to be a 
remarkably constant relationship between changes in stocks and 
commercial bank credit expansion. With so few observations and hence 
degrees of freedom, a regression line showing this relationship would 
be of dubious value: Figure 7 instead contains a line illustrating 
equality between stock-change and bank credit expansion. In five 
cases out of six, our observations lie very close to this line. It 
seems not altogether unreasonable for us to proceed on the assumption 
of a one-to-one correspondence between stock-change and bank credit expansion. 
We shall now assume that in the second half of the 1960's changes in 
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the enterprise sector of the economy's demand for stocks caused 
changes in the demand for and hence supply of bank loans, rather 
than vice-versa. (This rather extreme assumption will be modified 
shortly). Our problem therefore is to explain why stocks should 
have behaved as they did. 
The main determinant of the demand for stocks in the enterprise 
sector is likely to be the level of monetary G.D.P. We therefore 
show, in Figure 8 (i) the relationship between the level of 
stocks and the level of monetary G.D.P. at market prices? and 
(ii) the relationship between percentage changes in stocks anr7 
percentage changes in monetary G.D.P. at market prices, for t 
years 1966 to 1972. 
FIGURE 8 : THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STOCKS AND MONETARY G.D.P. 
AT MARKET PRICES. 
In Figure 8 (i) we have drawn a line illustrating what the relation-
ship would have been if we may assume (a) that the level of stocks 
in I966 and 1967 was considered adequate, and (b) that under normal 
circumstances the demand for stocks would grow at the same rate as 
monetary G.D.P. at market prices. This line is intended only to 
assist the reader's visual interpretation of the diagram: the two 
assumptions are not crucial to the discussion which follows. 
Figure 8 (ii) also includes a line illustrating ^quality between 
annual percentage changes in stocks and in monetary G.D.F. 
Taken together, the two diagrams suggest the following patterni in 
I968 there was a dramatic fall in the demand for stocks, which seems 
to have continued into 1969» in 1970 re-stocking began, and in 1971 
this re-stocking accelerated; finally, the demand for stocks fell 
once again in 1972. What explanation can be given for this pattern 
of annual variations in the demand for stocka? 
In industrialised market economies the major candidate for consid-
eration as an explanation of variations in the demand for stocks 
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would, be the short-term interest rate. But it is open to doubt, for 
a priori reasons, how interest-elastic the demand for stocks would 
be in Kenya* and in any case in the period under consideration the 
structure of interest-rates in Kenya remained virtually constant.""" 
We must therefore look elsewhere for an explanation. Fortunately, 
the annual variations revealed in Figure 8 coincide very well with 
what one would expect, given the politico-economic changes which 
were taking place in the Kenya economy. 
1967 was the year in which the first major steps were taken towards 
the Kenyanisation of the private sector of the economy. The 
Immigration Act received the Presidential Assent on 18 August, and. 
the Trade Licensing Act on 11 December of that year; the latter came 
into force on 8 January 1968. Both the Acts themselves, and initial 
uncertainties about the manner in which they would be implemented, 
would inevitably lead to some de-stocking in Kenya's (then) largely 
expatriate trading community. The Economic Survey remarked in mid-1968 
on "the present tendency of the commercial sector to operate on the 
basis of a minimum level of stocks as a result of uncertainties over 
the issue of trading licences." There can be little doubt that 
this remark was appropriate; and it seems very unlikely that we need 
look any further to explain the sudden rundown of stocks in 1968, 
and to a much lesser extent in 1969-
1969 was a year of considerable political uncertainty in Kenya, 
which culminated in a General Election in December. But that election's 
outcome, and the emergence of a reasonably stable (and hence predictable) 
implementation of the trade licencing policy, do seem to have had a. 
marked effect on "business confidence". The Nairobi Stock Exchange 
Index, which had remained on a plateau throughout 1968 and 1969, began 
3? 
to rise sharply in the early months of 1970. It therefore seems 
reasonable to attribute the recovery of stocks in 1970 and, more 
dramatically, 1971 to a return of "confidence". Our explanation 
of both the downswing and the upswing of what appears from Figure 8 
to have been a stock cycle in 1967-71 is thus essentially a political 
one. It is of course unsatisfactory for an economist to have to 
rely on such nebulous concepts as "business confidence" in his 
explanation of events; but there are occasions, of which this seems 
to be one, when to do otherwise would be to ignore the most obvious 
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in t erpr et at i on. 
We may summarise the argument of this section so far as follows. 
Between 1967 and. 1971 in Kenya, changes in "business confidence" 
attributable to political changes caused changes in the demand for 
stocks, which caused changes in the demand for bank credit, which, 
because loanable funds were in elastic supply, caused changes in 
the supply of credit to the enterprise sector of the economy. 
Inevitably this account is too simple, and we must-now introduce 
some minor qualifications. In particular, the account contrasts 
rather strongly with contemporary statements made by the monetary 
authorities, and some of these we must now consider. 
In June 1969 "the Government's Economic Survey referred approvingly 
to the improvement in commercial bank liquidity which had taken 
place since the previous year. In the following year, when we have 
suggested that re-stocking was already in progress, the Survey 
issued a mild admonishment: "Although creditworthiness cannot be 
ignored in lending policies, the rising liquidity of the banks 
suggests that this principle of lending is being interpreted per-
33 
haps too rigidly." By June 1971 the Government had detected 
sinister motives behind the surfeit of commercial bank liquidity, 
and the Survey's comment was positively threatening: "There are 
various reasons for this inability on the part of the commercial 
banks to increase their level of advances and loans sufficiently 
to match the rising level of deposits. One of these appears to be 
that the banks have not fully appreciated the nature and signif-
icance of the structural developments during the last years at the 
enterprise level ... they are still attuned to lending to a sector 
which is shrinking in the face of Kenyanization of the economy." 
We shall shortly suggest that this was a grossly misleading, and 
dangerous, comment to make in the middle of 1971. But would it have 
been fair a year earlier, when the commercial banks' liquidity was 
still exceptionally high and showing no signs of falling? That is, 
could the banks have been properly accused of "hoarding liquidity", 
denying to new African traders loans which they would have been 
ready to grant to their expatriate predecessors? Both the more 
liberal lending policies of the Government-owned banks, the National 
Bank of Kenya and (more recently) the Kenya Commercial Bank, and 
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what might be termed "ordinary considerations of banking prudence'" 
suggest that there was probably some truth in the charge. To the 
extent that this was the case, the movements in stocks described 
above would not have been due simply to demand factors, when 
"demand" is interpreted to mean "effective demand by businessmen", 
unqualified by the rider "as perceived by the commercial banks". 
But it would be misleading to suppose that we could explain all, or 
even a major part of the de-stocking of 1968-9 in these terms. For 
the effect of commercial bank reluctance to grant credit to the new 
businessmen would be confined to stocks in those businesses wb^'h 
were actually in process of being transferred - which was a rei.a,tively 
small number at any point in time; or, if the commercial banks had 
continued to discriminate in this way the effect on stocks, and so 
on the banks' liquidity ratio, would have been cumulative. Instead, 
what we have observed is a sudden de-stocking in 1968 far too large 
to have been confined to those businesses which were actually changing 
hands. It is therefore clear that much of the de-stocking was 
undertaken not in businesses which were actually being Africanised, 
but by businessmen who, after the measures of 19&7, anticipated that 
there businesses would be so at some uncertain point of time in the 
future. However liberal the banks had been in their lending policy 
after 19^7, therefore, a fall in stocks could hardly have been 
avoided. The main factor affecting the level of stocks was the 
effective demand for them, rather tnan the supply of credit. 
Whatever the correct balance of interpretation on this issue might 
have been, however, it had become by the middle of 1971 entirely 
irrelevant as an explanation of commercial bank behaviour. For, 
when the Economic Survey made its comment in June 1971, the 
process of re-stocking had been gathering momentum for over a year; 
commercial bank lending was rising at an annual rate of over 40$; 
the banks' liquidity ratio had been falling steeply for six months; 
and the inevitable consequence of this rate of credit expansion -
a fall in Kenya's foreign exchange reserves - had been happening 
for three months. By the fourth quarter of 1971, when commercial 
bank liquidity had fallen to the minimum level that we have suggested 
the banks found it prudent to hold, the foreign exchange reserves 
had fallen to a level (of slightly over four months' imports) which. 
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without the stock "cycle" of 1967-71, they would otherwise have 
reached in a rather less erratic manner. It was at roughly this 
point that Government's deficit financing in 1970/1, discussed in 
the previous section, began to take effect. 
Part 5 s Conclusion. 
The previous two sections of this paper have sketched in very broad 
outline the financial background to the reserve crisis of 1971« Iti 
is not the purpose of this concluding section to draw in detail 
the many morals which emerge from the record : that task must 
await a more thorough statistical analysis than has been possible 
here. We shall confine ourselves to a summary of the argument, and 
to fitting together the pieces of the jigsaw which earlier sections 
have considered separately. 
What, then, did happen in 1971? On the basis of our account, we 
may assert: 
(i) that the rapid growth of reserves in the three years before the 
crisis was a misleading indicator of the "health" of Kenya's balance 
of payments; it was due, rather, to a rundown of inventories in the 
enterprise sector of the economy; 
(ii) that reserves began to decline in April 1971 because of rapid 
bank credit expansion to the enterprise sector to finance a recovery 
of stocks from their depressed level of the preceding few years; 
(iii) that this recovery of stocks was in itself eminently desirable, 
and if it had been the only factor causing the reserve loss this loss 
would have cured itself by the end of 1971 without causing Kenya's 
reserves to decline significantly below the level which was consid-
ered a reasonable safe minimum. 
(iv) This was not, however, the only factor. In 1970 the Government 
had set in motion a record level of deficit-financed expenditure: 
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the impact of this on the financial system was delayed, but it wat 
certain to begin affecting the foreign exchange reserves directly 
from about mid-1971 onwards and to open up the prospect of a multiple 
expansion of credit to the private sector which could possibly have 
caused the reserves to disappear completely. 
The seriousness of the crisis now emerges in sharp focus. The recovery 
of private sector stocks, and the reserve loss which financed it, 
should on its own have been welcomed. Alternatively, if this recovery 
had not been taking place, there was (as we suggested in part 3) a 
strong case for Government itself to deplete the reserves by th type 
of deficit spending which was irreversibly in the pipeline by mid-1971. 
Neither of these things, on its own, would have reduced reserves 
below the level which was considered safe. But they could not both 
happen without the reserves falling far below that level, unless the 
Government was prepared to take the drastic measures which the 
1970-4 Development Plan had mentioned, and declared to be undesirable. 
There is thus a strong prima facie case for the conclusion that 
Government's financial policy up to the end of 1971 was not only a 
necessary, but also a sufficient condition for the crisis. Like 
Winnie-the-Pooh in the quotation with which this paper began, the 
Government faced a choice between three things, any two of which 
were compatible. Unlike Pooh it believed, until too late, that it 
could reconcile all three. 
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STATISTICAL APPHTDIX. 
This Appendix does not present all the data on which the Figures 
in the text are based. My aim in presenting it is partly to allow 
the reader to check the most important calculations, but mainly to 
indicate where the data comes from. 
TABLE 2 : CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE. 
Kfcm 
YEAR RECUR. REV. EXT. LOANS L-T DOM S-T DOM TOTAL EXPEND. 
& DP EARNINGS & GRANTS BORR'G. BORR'G. 
1959/60 37.94 6.01 1.75 11 46.36 
1960/61 38.09 12.04 0.30 11 50.94 
1961/62 40.64 12.63 O.29 11 52.37 
1962/63 44.62 13.60 - 11 57.73 
1963/64 48.12 20.73 - 11 68.13 
1964/65 51.56 20.44 1.03 11 70.54 
1965/66 56.95 14.53 2.01 11 77.52 
1966/67 66.41 11.31 7.82 11 84.88 
1967/68 77.94 9-73 8.29 0.72 94.57 
1968/69 85.39 8.08 8.29 5-59 104.98 
1969/70 98.33 12.22 13.64 5-07 121.46 
1970/71 124.36 11.77 8.12 15.00 156.81 
" indicates very small (below Kfc lm.) 
Source: The figures for 1964/65 to 1970/71 in this table have been taken 
from the Kenya Statistical Abstract 1972, Table 194 ("The Financing of the 
Government Deficit"). The figures for earlier years have been obtained from 
earlier Abstracts on the basis of the very helpful explanation at the foot 
of the 1972 Table of how the figures in the various Government accounts can 
be reconciled. 
TABLE 3 : MONETARY G.D.Po AT MARKET PRICES. (Kfcm) 
1966 314.4 
1967 333.2 
1968 370.7 
1969 405.8 
1970 455.8 
1971 516.1 
1972 568.4 
a indicates a provisional figure, published in the Economic Survey 1973' 
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Source; These figures have been obtained, from the Tables labelled. "Use of Nati rial 
Resources" in the Kenya Statistical Abstracts (and Economic Surveys), by 
subtracting from total G.D.P. at current market prices the figure for 
Non-monetary G.D.P. 
TABLE 4 : MONETARY DATA (K£m) 
YEAR QUARTER 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1966 4 42.06 83.9 
1967 1 44-17 -6.78 
2 43.61 -4.95 
3 45-13 -3.94 
4 31.59 £.12 66.89 15.68 85.03 90.60 
1968 1 35.96 -4.44 69.79 12.35 84.92 
2 38.21 -3.88 66.88 15.16 85.23 
3 41.11 2.18 64.37 20.96 89.47 
4 43.59 3.90 65.72 22.28 95.13 93-2 
1969 1 52.62 1.04 63.54 27.45 98.96 
2 55-43 1.87 66.26 30.51 105.31 
3 63.ll 3.31 67-53 34-18 107.39 
4 65.ll 7.13 69.42 37.21 112.93 101.7 
1970 1 74.70 1.13 73-74 36.36 123.10 
2 72.55 -O.29 80.01 31.24 125.35 
3 77-99 2.34 77.21 38.53 133.19 
4 83-93 5.69 84.27 44.15 146.19 115.1 
1971 1 89.09 6.6 0 90.32 44.86 149.66 
2 75.09 3.85 100.14 36.83 154.77 
3 64.70 8.87 107.96 35.02 157.98 
4 62.76 11.00 114.13 31.04 159.34 133.1 
Column 1 shows Kenya's foreign exchange reserves. The figures are taken from 
the "Monetary Survey" Tables of the Annual Reports of the Central Bank. 
Column 2 shows Central Government's indebtedness to the banking system. The 
figures are from the same source. 
Column 3 shows commercial bank lending to the "enterprise sector^* defined heret 
as total commercial bank lending less lending to Government. The 
figures are taken from the "Commercial Bankst Analysis of Bills, Loan 
and Advances" Tables of the Annual Reports of the Central Bank. 
Column 4 shows Liquid Assets of the commercial banks, defined here as cash, 
balances due by banks abroad, and Treasury Bills. The figures are 
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taken from the "Commercial Banks: Assets and Liabilities" Tables 
of the Annual Reports of the Central Bank. 
Column 5 shows total commercial bank: deposits. The figures are taken from the 
same source. 
Column 6 shows the level of stocks in the economy. The figure for I968 is 
taken from the Kenya Statistical Digest, vol. 7, no. 2 (June 1969); 
those for the other years have been calculated from figures for 
stock changes published in the "Use of National Resources" Tables 
of the Kenya Statistical Abstracts. 
A final word about the reliability of the statistics. Those in Table 2, 
and columns 1 - 5 of Table 4> are likely to be very accurate indeed. 
The G.D.P. figures in Table 3 are likely to be much less so, although 
Kenya's monetary G.D.P. figures are relatively good by international 
standards. The stock figures in column 6 of Table 4 are probably less 
reliable still, though I am not sure about this. 
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NOTES. 
1. The unit of currency in Kenya is the Kenya shilling. However the 
Central Bank: of Kenya Act stipulates in Section 19 (2) that 
"Twenty shillings shall equal one Kenya pound-"; and since the 
pound is a more convenient unit than the shilling for comparing 
the very large sums of money with which this paper is concerned, 
all sums of money are referred to in units of million Kenya pounds. 
2. Bernstein (1956), P 159-
3. I.L.O. (1972), pp 98-9. 
4. A good summary of the controversy can be found in the arti"~-8S 
by de Oliveira Campos, Felix and Grunwald in Hirschman (19 
The best formal statement of the "old" structuralist view xa 
Seers (1962). The views of the I.L.O. Reports, (1970), (1971) 
and (1972) are in the same tradition, though these reports seek 
to explain a different problem and therefore do add considerably 
to the "old" structuralist view. 
A structuralist interpretation of Kenya's balance-of-payments 
problems ofsan entirely different sort has recently b*«n advanced 
by Power (1972). As an explanation of the 1971 crisis in Kenya 
this interpretation is open to the same objections as the present 
paper makes to the view of the I.L.O. Report. 
5. Kenya, Economic Survey 1972, pp 23-7. 
6. This rather abrupt statement is based on the reserve-loss 
implications of Domestic Credit Expansion to be derived from 
the "Polak model". The model is set forth in Polak (1957) and 
Polak and Boissonneault (1959)> and expounded in Bolnick (1973) 
and pp 73-85 of Newlyn (I968). 
The evidence suggests that the Polak model - subject to certain 
modifications, which are necessary in the light of the conclusions 
reached in the present paper - fits the Kenya economy of recent 
years rather well. However, since the marginal velocity of 
circulation of money seems in Kenya to have been less than the 
average velocity, the reserve loss consequent upon any given 
D.C.E. will be somewhat less than the D.C.E. itself. 
But the Polak model is an aggregate model, and therefore not 
suitable without modification for dealing with the question of 
how the initial direction of D.C.E. will affect the consequent 
reserve loss. In terms of the model, the initial direction of 
D.C.E. is relevant to the size of the reserve loss only to the 
extent that it changes the velocity of circulation of money, 
and/or the import-income ratio. If the wealthy'both save, and 
import, more than the poor, the provision of D.C.E. to the 
wealthy in the first instance may raise the import-income ratio 
but it will also tend to lower the velocity of circulation. 
These two effects will work in opposite directions. It is 
therefore very much open to question whether, and if so in what 
way, the initial direction of D.C.E. will affect the size of the 
resulting reserve loss. 
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7. Loxley (1965); Newlyn (I967). 
8. Kratz (1966). 
9. Gaskin (1965); Loxley (I965); Loxley and Newlyn (1967): and 
Newlyn (1967). 
10. Newlyn (1967), P 34. 
11. This summary of the Kenya Government's "fiscal problem" at the 
time of independence is based on I.B.R.D. (1963). 
12. The Kenya Government accounts, as published, are divided into 
a "Recurrent Account" (which before independence was called the 
"Colony Account") and a "Development Account". The allocation 
of expenditures between these two accounts appears to be on the 
basis of whether the expenditure will or will not give rise 
either directly or indirectly (through its effect on G.D.P ) to 
higher Government revenues in future years* but the allocation 
is inevitably a rather rough-and-ready one. The allocation of 
revenues between the two accounts is in many cases a matter of 
convention, with little if any economic significance. Thus 
short-term borrowing on Recurrent Account is done through the 
issue of Treasury Bills; short-term borrowing on Development 
Account is done through borrowing from the Central Bank. 
The distinction is not a useful one for the purposes of the 
present paper, and in our discussion of Government revenues and 
expenditures we have therefore amalgamated the Recurrent and 
Development Account figures, eliminating transfers between them. 
13. I.B.R.D. (1963). 
14. An excellent discussion of this empirical problem, in the Ghana 
context, can be found in Ahmad (1970), esp. pp 26-36. 
15. See the comment on these two forms of borrowing in note 12 above. 
16. The Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation in Kenya is a rather 
unusual source of short-term finance for Government. A brief 
explanation of how it works can be found in Central Bank of Kenya 
(1972), pp 28 and 32; there is a more extanded discussion in 
Loxley (I965), chapter 4. 
17. Republic of Kenya (1969). 
18. Mitchell (1970), p 32. 
19. The rough calculations in this paragraph are based on the 
"comparative static" implications of a combination of the Polak 
model and orthodox bank deposit multiplier analysis. 
20. There appears to be some discrepancy between the published 
Government accounts, and the Central Bank figures presented 
in Figure 4> on the question of the actual amount of net Central 
Government borrowing from the banking system between 1 July 1970 
and 30 June 1971. This discrepancy is almost certainly due to 
the fact that payments into and out of the Exchequer account do 
not always occur exactly in the financial year in respect of 
which these payments are made. In an analysis of 
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the impact of Government finance on the economy, the figures 
published by the Central Bank (which show the actual position 
at any point in time) are therefore to be preferred. 
21. For the period up to 1950, see Newlyn and Rowan (1954); for the 
period from 1950 "to "the mid-1960's see Loxley (1965) and 
Newlyn (1967). A good description (rather than analysis) of 
the commercial banks in East Africa at the end of the 1960's 
can be found in Pauw (1970). 
22. Central Bank of Kenya Act (Laws of Kenya, Chapter 491) esp. 
Sections 38-40. See also the Banking Act (Laws of Kenya* 
Chapter 488) Section 18. 
23. Central Bank of Kenya, Annual Report 1967-
24. Central Bank of Kenya, Annual Report 1968, p 21. 
25. Central Bank of Kenya, Annual Report I968, p 21. 
26. The liquid assets ratio shown in Figure 5s which is based on 
the figures for banks' liquid assets and total deposits shown 
in the Statistical Appendix., Table 5» does not correspond 
exactly with the liquid assets ratio as defined by the Central 
Bank. Unfortunately the Central Bank has only published figures 
showing banks' liquid assets and deposits defined in accordance 
with the statutory minimum ratio since that statutory ratio was 
introduced in 1969- In order to push the series further back in 
time, we have therefore been obliged to use a rather different 
definition. During the period for which the Central Bank has 
published figures showing the liquid assets ratio of the 
commercial banks, however, the correspondence between these 
figures and those shown in Figure 5 has been very close indeed.* 
which suggests that the discrepancy is unimportant. 
27. I am indebted to Prof. S.R. Lewis Jr..for drawing my attention 
to the recent behaviour of stocks in the Kenya economy in an 
informal seminar at the Institute for Development Studies in 
January 1973- Prof. Lewis is not however responsible for the 
specific ways in which stock-changes enter into the argument 
of this paper. 
28. The reason is that independent errors of measurement in the 
original stock series introduce negative serial correlation 
into first differences. This is a familiar problem in monetary 
econometrics. 
29. The actual regression of stock-change on change in average bank 
lending is as follows: 
S = 4.50+-0.52 BL R2 = O.65 
where S is an annual change in stocks, 
and BL is an annual change in bank lending to the 
enterprise sector (between the average of the four end-
of-quarter figures), 
both expressed in millions of Kenya pounds. 
(The product-moment correlation coefficient r is significant at the 
0.05 level, despite the few degrees of freedom). 
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30. This is true for all interest rates except the Treasury Bill rate. 
During 1969-70, when the commercial banks were highly liquid but 
when they were no longer able to earn interest on their liquid 
assets by lending short-term overseas, the Central Bank was able 
to drive the Treasury Bill rate below 2$ by the simple expedient 
of ceasing to pay interest on commercial bank deposits with 
itself. There is some reason for believing that it was in part 
the unusual cheapness of this form of borrowing which tempted 
the Government into a resort to deficit financing on a major 
scale. If so, the artificial cheapness of borrowing through 
the issue of Treasury Bills was rather dangerous; for, despite 
frequent assertions to the contrary by the Central Bank, this 
form of borrowing does not "soak up" commercial bank liquidity* 
The important point for present purposes, however, is that 
variations in the rate on Treasury Bills were insulated from 
the remainder of the interest-rate structure. Short-term 
lending rates of the commercial banks remained constant throughout 
the period. 
31. Kenya, Economic Survey 1968, p 157* 
32. As a barometer of "business confidence", the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange Index has to be treated with some care. This is partly 
because of the rather unrepresentative character of the firms 
covered by the Index (which is discussed in the Economic Survey 
1970, p 25). More seriously, however, of the two periods since 
independence when the Index has risen significantly, the first, 
which began in the second half of I965, clearly had very little 
to do with "confidence" but a very great deal to do with the 
imposition of Exchange Control in June of that yeay© I do believe, 
though, that the rise in the Index during 1970 and 1971 was 
largely due to "confidence" factors* 
33. Kenya, Economic Survey 1970, p 23« 
34. Kenya, Economic Survey 1971* P 26« 
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